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Highlights 
- The relevance of geographically neighboring companies on the financial 
decisions taken by a company is examined.  
- We find nonlinearities in the adjustment process of financial ratios when some 
basic characteristics of the company are considered.  
- We conclude that reactive environments favor the responsiveness of companies 
under changes in local environments. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research into corporate finances has found that the financial decisions of peer 
companies tend to be related. Companies tend to “kept an eye” on the decisions of other 
companies, which can be attributed to problems caused by the lack of information 
(Granovetter, 1985). Managers work under conditions of high uncertainty, with partial 
and asymmetric information that limits their capacity to make optimal decisions; thus, 
decisions taken by other companies are of great importance for them (Leary and Robert, 
2014). However, peer effects on firms’ financial decisions have been scarcely 
considered. From an empirical perspective, Graham and Harvey (2011), based on a 
questionnaire intended for a significant number of chief financial officers (CFOs), place 
a high value on the financial decisions of other peer companies when devising 
companies’ strategies. Leary and Roberts (2014) analyze this effect giving direct 
evidence of peer effects in firm financial decisions. 
In fact, these results can be connected to Manski (1993) model. Interaction 
between companies is produced through a social network, a structure made of nodes, 
companies, which are tied by dependence relations in their financial decisions. There is 
interaction because the behaviour of a company adapts to the collective behaviour of its 
reference group (its neighbours), that is the peer effect, and also because the exogenous 
factors associated to this group may have an impact on the decisions of the company; 
that is the contextual effect. We may also think in the so-called correlated effect arising 
from the unobservables that, for example, may encourage some companies to locate 
near other companies to benefit from different types of agglomeration economies; this 
case of endogenous location will not be considered here. Assuming that the location is 
exogenous, there may be unobservables reflecting environmental or institutional 
influences that have an impact on the decisions of the companies located in the area. 
The ability of a company to obtain information from its peers may be affected by its 
size. Leary and Robert (2014) analyse this effect obtaining that small companies are more 
sensible to peer effects. It is clear that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are at a 
disadvantage compared to large companies. Managers in small companies must cope with 
severe restrictions on information because they do not have easy access to experts and 
specialized information channels (Carreira and Silva, 2010). Information is critical to 
making good decisions, and therefore SME managers often attempt to compensate this 
deficit by using information from different sources (for example, local or regional 
surroundings, informal channels in the industry, etc.). In addition, small companies have 
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stronger incentives to correct for unbalances because their high (relative) costs resulting 
from them (Davis and Peles, 1993). Therefore, SMEs are more prone to mimicking 
financial practices because they seek to improve their performance. This is not the case for 
large companies, which have enough resources to monitor the markets and competitors by 
themselves (Reppenhagen, 2010). 
Recent literature has brought up another issue: geography. According to Carbó et 
al., (2003) and Degryse and Ongena (2005), asymmetric information problems and 
agency costs are reduced by proximity. Indeed, there are numerous studies that evaluate 
the impact of the distance between firms and its capital providers such as investors 
(Brown et al., 2014; O’Brien and Tan, 2015) or financial entities (Knyazeva and 
Knyazeva, 2012; Rao et al., 2015). However, the effects of proximity to other peer 
companies on a firm’s financial decisions have been less treated. Degryse and Ongena 
(2005) maintain that clustering and geographical proximity favor the flow of 
information between companies. Fernández and Maudos (2009) and Palacín-Sánchez 
and Di Pietro (2015) point out the role of banks in sharing common practices. It should 
be noted here that bank branches focus on segmented local markets, the same as other 
financial agents (Massa and Simonov, 2006; Uysal et al., 2008). 
Treacy and Carey (2000) point to the use of credit score models specific to each 
bank. The score models provide different assessments for different companies and 
follow a certain geographical pattern that discriminates between locations. Conversely, 
this procedure offers implicit information to the companies in the area on which “good” 
standards are preferred by the financial system. Another example of informal 
geographical segmentation is suppliers providing selling prices and financing conditions 
according to the situation of each local market. The result is a kind of soft geographical 
segmentation of the financial markets, where slight but relevant different conditions 
apply to the various areas. Companies located in the same local market will face similar 
financial conditions, which are different from other areas, favoring the appearance of a 
similar financial structure. 
Another strand of literature has concluded that the existence of non-economic, 
informal factors is related to geographical proximity. Pirinsky and Wang (2010) have 
noted a “co-movement in the stock returns of firms headquartered in the same area”; 
this co-movement is attributed to a regional, unobservable pattern that can be proxied 
by a set of local indicators. Gao et al. (2013), more explicitly, maintain that the location 
of firms partly explains their capital structures and payout policies; in fact, they 
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demonstrate that companies located in the same area exhibit similar leverage and 
liquidity ratios. This similarity is not a coincidence, but is rather the result of 
unobserved local effects and the interaction between companies.  
Managers working in the same area normally have opportunities to build face-to-
face relationships, exchange ideas and learn from others’ experiences. Local 
environments facilitate such interactions. Davis and Greve (1997) mention social and 
professional clubs which can promote informal activities. Mizruchi (1996) points to the 
practice of sharing staff members on respective boards of directors (a board interlock). 
In such cases, firms will have direct access to the decision-making process of other 
companies through board interlock. 
Anyway, it is clear that proximity improves the transmission channels 
strengthening peer effects in financial decisions among companies, and this is our main 
hypothesis here. 
The purpose of our research is twofold. First, we test for the existence of 
interaction effects in the financial decisions made by a representative group of Spanish 
industrial companies. Moreover, as previously stated, our hypothesis is that 
geographical proximity promotes convergence among peers. Second, we aim to prove 
that the peer effects, arising from geographical proximity, fit to the characteristics of the 
companies. As indicated, small companies have greater incentives to adjust their 
financial ratios than large corporations, the same applies to high and low tech 
companies, old vs young companies or firms working in national or international 
markets. Thus, we expect to find significant nonlinearities in the data. In this context, 
we examine the financial behavior of a large group of Spanish companies using a Partial 
Adjustment Model (PAM). Our analysis is supported by three financial ratios 
representative of each firm’ financial dimension: liquidity, indebtedness and 
profitability (Soboh et al., 2009). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the well-known 
PAM model, including spatial interaction effects. Section 3 discusses the data that 
support our study. Section 4 estimates de different equations implied by the interaction 
hypothesis and Section 5 concludes with a summary of main results. 
 
2. A nonlinear partial adjustment model 
To test the interaction hypothesis between neighboring peer companies we use a 
classic PAM, which has been modified by the inclusion of spatial effects. As is well 
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known, PAM models assume that the financial ratios of the firms evolve over time 
owing to adjustment towards optimal values (Lev, 1969). Given an external shock that 
disturbs previous equilibriums, companies should reconsider their financial objectives. 
The problem is the lack of suitable information for the companies to set the new 
optimum, which leads to them using reference values such as industrial averages.  
Companies with financial ratios far from their benchmarks incur costs by being out 
of equilibrium, which are usually higher than the adjustment costs. Thus, managers 
change accounting practices (e.g., they use inventory evaluation methods, substituting 
short-term for long-term debt, etc.) to readjust their financial ratios. In addition, market 
forces press the financial magnitudes of the whole industry in the same way. For 
example, the expectation of high returns will attract new companies to enter the 
industry, driving profitability ratios toward sustainable values (Peles and Schneller, 
1988). 
 
2.1 The classical PAM 
The PAM model was originally proposed by Lev (1969) and has become a very 
popular technique in applied research. The model is very simple. Its main assumption 
states that changes in an indicator under the control of company i in period t, Yit, adjusts 
proportionally to the gap between the optimal amount in period t,  and the observed 
amount in (t-1), Yit-1. The adjustment resulting from different causes such as markets 
rigidities, fixed costs or indivisibilities may be instantaneous or not. In brief: 
 (1) 
where  is a parameter that measures the speed of adjustment and eit is an error term. 
According to (1), the speed of adjustment  is the ratio between the optimal change,
 and the observed change . To conclude in favor of the existence 
of an adjustment process,  should remain between 0 and 1. In the case of =0, there is 
no adjustment and the indicator maintains the same value. At the other extreme, if =1 
the gap is corrected instantaneously, . According to the applied literature,  is 
usually an interior point of the interval (0,1), where the adjustment is incomplete or is 
only partially complete; hence the name Partial Adjustment Model.  
*
itY
Yit Yit1  (Yit* Yit1)  eit

*
it it 1(Y Y ) it it 1Y Y 

*
it itY Y 
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Let us note that the objective, , is not observable and must be estimated in 
advance in order to build a PAM model. Several proposals have been made in the 
literature, e.g., by Lev (1969, note 2), who suggests estimating this optimal value by 
using the industrial average in period (t-1). 
 
2.2 A nonlinear PAM model 
 There is a large literature devoted to PAM models that has put forward 
criticisms and suggestions (e.g., Gallizo et al., 2008 or Mate et al., 2012). In our case, 
we are going to focus on the assumption of a homogeneous speed of adjustment. This is 
a sensible hypothesis only for a uniform set of companies; however, when using a 
heterogeneous group, as is usually the case, the hypothesis should be relaxed. Lev 
(1969) highlights the relevance of the problem: ‘In (...) a large and heterogeneous 
sample, there is no way to identify specific techniques which probably differ from firm 
to firm’ (p. 299). Taking into account this limitation, several authors have dealt with the 
“heterogeneity question” by examining the link between financial ratio adjustment 
processes and companies’ characteristics (Lee and Wu, 1988; Seay et al., 2004, Aybar-
Arias et al., 2012).  
 Faulkender et al. (2012) find strong nonlinearities in their study on the dynamics 
of corporate financial ratios, which they attribute to firms’ characteristics. Their 
conclusion is that this effect ‘should be incorporated in empirical studies of corporate 
leverage’ to reduce estimation biases and inconsistencies. We follow their suggestion 
by introducing a simple set of dummy variables in the PAM equation of (1): 
 (2) 
where , {k=1,….,K-1} is a binary variable which takes the value 1 if company i 
belongs to the category k. As usual,  is the coefficient that measures adjustment speed 
for the reference group (in this case, group K), and  the speed differential 
corresponding to group k with respect to the K-th. 
 
2.3 Factors that impact on the speed of convergence 
 The size and the economic activity of the firm are considered potential sources 
of heterogeneity in (1), but are not the only sources, as discussed below. 
*
itY
Yit  Yit1  (Yit* Yit1)  k (Yit*  Yit1) kg
k1
K1  eit
kg
k
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2.3.1 Distance to the optimum 
An element that often emerges as a relevant conditioning factor in the 
adjustment of financial ratios is the distance to the objective, which measures the 
disequilibrium that the company suffers at that moment. We expect that companies in 
worse situation, in the sense of being farthest from their optimum, assume greater 
efforts to reach their objectives since stronger disequilibrium means higher costs. On the 
contrary, companies whose financial ratios are closer to their objectives are less forced 
to take action and may tend to maintain their position. This reasoning also leads to a 
nonlinear structure of the PAM, allowing for different speeds of adjustment depending 
on the distance to the optimum, as suggested previously, for example, by Aybar-Arias et 
al. (2012) or Lee and Wu (1988). 
2.3.2 Size of firms 
Firm size is a very important factor in this discussion. Applied literature usually 
distinguishes between small and large companies. Lee and Wu (1988), analyze six 
financial ratios using a sample of large and small companies. They noted a positive and 
significant relationship between the size of the company and adjustment coefficients. 
Aybar-Arias et al. (2012) focus on the indebtedness ratio, arguing that large companies 
have, proportionally, smaller restructuration costs and, therefore, should have a higher 
speed of adjustment. However, we also find empirical studies with the opposite result. 
From this perspective, small companies have stronger incentives to correct the 
disequilibrium because (relatively) high costs of this situation (Davis and Peles, 1993). 
This is not, necessarily, the case for large companies which have easier access to 
information, technology and financial markets. In addition, their reduced dimension 
allows small firms quicker reactions having more flexibility and less bureaucracy than 
large firms. Wu and Ho (1997) demonstrate that smaller firms adjust ratios to the 
optimal value faster than large firms. 
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to consider the existence of a general 
adjustment process common to all companies, which drives the financial ratios of the 
industry toward similar target values. On the contrary, we expect to find different 
adjustment processes for different groups of companies, depending on their size. 
 
2.3.3 Technological intensity 
 Different industries mean different markets, each of which has different 
standards, institutions and competitive mechanisms. The hypothesis is that the 
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company’s proactivity in relation to changes in the environment, both general and 
immediate, depends on the characteristics of the market in which the company works. 
Lee and Wu (1988) detect strong differences in the adjustment processes that 
correspond to different industrial sectors, as do Chen and Ainina (1994), Gallizo and 
Salvador (2003) or Gallizo et al. (2008) using PAM models. This presumption extends 
to financial ratios. 
2.3.4 Regional characteristics 
 Regional economics assesses positively the role of the so-called “institutional 
and financial” factors, which are defined as the combination of political, cultural and 
economic features that characterize each territory. As stated by Carbó et al. (2007), this 
mixture has a huge influence on firms’ financial behavior in the territory, but there are 
few studies analyzing this impact in deep. Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001) find that the 
regional financial network, measured through the number of financial entities, greatly 
affects the quantity and quality of firms’ credit. Similarly, Michelacci and Silva (2007) 
build a regional financial development indicator that determines firms’ credit 
availability. Du and Xiu (2009) focus on the relationship between regional 
governments, regional markets and legal systems, highlighting the relevance of regional 
factors for the firms located in the territory. Fan et al. (2013) indicate that regions with 
dense and stronger social and economic networks also have robust economic systems 
that, among other things, provide adequate financing to their companies. In sum, 
according to the literature, it is important to control also for regional peculiarities in 
order to reduce heterogeneity in the adjustment processes. 
 
2.3.5 Import/Export Activities 
There is broad evidence that international corporate activity is one of the 
determinants of capital structure (Low and Chen, 2004 or Pacheco, 2016). Previous 
empirical studies conclude that multinational corporations tend to have lower leverage, 
financing their business with equity rather than debt due to risk considerations (e.g., 
exchange rate risk and/or political risk) (Desay et al., 2008). Pantzalis (2003) gives 
evidence about the higher agency costs for multinational companies in comparison with 
domestic firms. These higher costs will cause multinational companies have more 
incentives to adjust their financial ratios to the target values at quicker rates in order to 
avoid incur in additional risk costs.  
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2.3.6 Age 
Regarding previous studies, we find the age of a firm as an additional factor on 
its financial performance acting as an inverse proxy for volatility and for the costs of 
bankruptcy (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Cole, 2013). In this sense, older firms will have 
fewer incentives to adapt their financial structures to new, perhaps more adequate 
average values in comparison with newcomers. Thus, we should expect a lower 
adjustment rate for older companies. 
3. Interaction among companies. A heterogeneous PAM model with spatial effects. 
 The interaction hypothesis implies not only that there is mutual dependence 
among peer companies, but also that interaction intensifies with geographical proximity. 
Following Leary and Robert’s study (2015), we put forward three different channels to 
allow for the interaction between firms strengthened by proximity: 
 An endogenous interaction effect, where the financial decisions of company i 
depend explicitly on the decisions taken by the companies located nearby. The 
literature on spatial econometrics uses the term Spatial Lag Model (SLM) to 
indicate that a “weighted” average of the reactions of the neighbors of company i 
should appear in the right hand side of equation (2). This can be associated with the 
peer effect of Manski (1993). 
 An exogenous interaction effect, where financial decisions of company i depends 
not only on the gap of company i, ,  but also on a “weighted” average 
of the gaps of the neighbors of company i. This situation receives the name 
Spatial Lag in X (SLX) variables in spatial econometrics literature, and 
corresponds to the contextual factors of Manski (1993).  
 Finally, interaction may also appear from unobserved effects in the error terms of 
equation (1). This may be due to the omission of relevant variables in the 
equation, different from the gap in (1), to the existence of local features or 
regional trends (not modeled in the equation) or, simply, to weaker forms of 
cross-sectional interaction. This is a Spatial Error Model (SEM). 
These models are commonly used in the field of spatial or regional economic 
analysis and are becoming popular in the more general setting of social interaction 
networks where the purpose is to calibrate the interrelationships between a set of 
networked individuals. It should be noted here that this is also our main objective. 
*
it it 1(Y Y )
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To further this objective, it is crucial to define the notion of closeness or 
“neighborhood,” which is not evident. The literature on spatial econometrics suggests 
the use of the so-called ‘contiguity or weighting matrix’ denoted by W. This is a matrix 
of order (nxn), where n is the number of individuals in the sample, specified 
exogenously, so that the researcher marks the units (companies) which are close to a 
given unit (company). For example, row i identifies the companies which are located in 
the neighborhood of company i whereas column i indicates to which companies the i-th 
firm is close to in the sample. The distinction between columns and rows should be read 
in terms of impacts (in the sense that column i identifies the companies that are 
influenced by company i, and row i the companies that affect company i). Obviously, 
this distinction is irrelevant in cases of purely symmetric relations, but symmetry is not 
always an acceptable restriction (consider the impact on the US economy of the 
Mexican economy and the impact on the Mexican economy from the US economy). 
The terms in the diagonal of W are set to zero, for identification purposes, and there is 
ample flexibility for defining the weights corresponding to the other terms, which are 
non-negative;  for i = 1,…,n and . We must recall that the 
specification of W is a very important decision because the weight matrix is supposed 
to reflect the structure of the connections that exist among the companies. In spite of 
that, the procedure of building W is rather informal. Corrado and Fingleton (2012) 
admit that there is not any protocol in the literature to guide the user on this point. 
Indeed, mainly ad hoc procedures dominate based on some measure of separation 
between the individuals (see Harris et al., 2011). 
On these premises, we are going to consider three extensions to the basic interaction 
model of (2). 
 The mixed partial adjustment model-spatial lag model, PAM-SLM: 
 (3) 
 The mixed partial adjustment model-spatial error model, PAM-SEM: 
 (4) 
ii 0 ij 0;i j 
n K 1* *
ijit it 1 it it 1 jt jt 1 k it it 1 itk
j i k 1
Y Y (Y Y ) (Y Y ) (Y Y ) eg

    
          
K 1 n* *
ijit it 1 it it 1 k it it 1 it it it itk
k 1 j i
Y Y (Y Y ) (Y Y ) u ;u u eg

   
           
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 The mixed partial adjustment model-spatial Durbin model, PAM-SDM: 
 
 (5) 
 
Finally, it should be considered that we are mixing information from a (large and 
heterogeneous) group of companies, which were observed over a number of time 
periods. This is a panel dataset and, as such, we are going to introduce unobserved 
individual and time effects in the right-hand side of equations (1) to (5). The estimation 
of panel data models, with or without spatial effects, is now a routine task that can be 
undertaken using standard software, such as R, STATA, MATLAB, etc., (see Baltagi, 
2013, or LeSage and Pace, 2009, for general textbooks and Lee and Yu, 2010a and b, 
Lee and Yu, 2012 or Elhorst, 2014 for more specialized references). 
 
4. Data for the analysis 
We use a sample of Spanish manufacturing SMEs companies located in 12 provinces 
(Nuts III units according to Eurostat) along the Spanish Mediterranean Axis (SMA). 
This geographical area accounts for more than 40% of total population (approximately 
19 million inhabitants), and concentrate more than 40% of Spanish economic activity in 
less than 20% of the country territory. Figure 1 show the SMA area divided in 
administrative provinces. 
Data come from the database Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI). The 
sample is composed of 12,444 companies (NACE codes 1000 to 3320), for the period 
2006-2012; their geographical distribution appears in Figure 1. All companies with 
more than 250 employees and without employees were excluded. We analyse reduced 
size companies which are more sensible to peer effects (Leary and Robert, 2014). The 
sample represents, approximately, 20% of all manufacturing companies located in 
SMA, with a number of employees between 1 and 250 according to census of Spanish 
companies (Directorio Central de Empresas, DIRCE, provided by the Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics), at the end of 2012. The number of employees in our sample, in 
n K 1* *
ijit it 1 jt jt 1 it it 1 k it it 1 k
j i k 1
n K 1 n* *
ij ijit it 1 k jt jt 1 itk
j i k 1 j i
Y Y (Y Y ) (Y Y ) (Y Y )g
(Y Y ) (Y Y ) eg

    

   
          
        
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2012, is approximately 230,000 that represent almost 15% of total employees in 
Spanish industrial sector (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the composition of the 
sample in terms of industrial sectors). The location of a company is defined by the 
geographical coordinates of its headquarters. Corporate headquarters are the centers 
where the main financial decisions of the company are taken and where, basically, 
interaction with other agents takes place (Pirinsky and Wang, 2010); thus, this is not a 
restriction for our work. 
Using this information, three financial ratios representative of three financial 
dimensions have been obtained for each company (Soboh et al., 2009). The first two 
pertain to liquidity and indebtedness and measure the ability of a firm to fulfil (pay) its 
current obligations as they arise, and the nature of any financing equity. The third is 
related to the profitability and evaluates the ability of a company to generate earnings. 
Liquidity is measured by the Current ratio (henceforth CU) computed as Short Term 
Assets divided by Short Term Liabilities. Indebtedness is evaluated by the Debt Equity 
ratio (henceforth DE) calculated as Total Liabilities over Total Assets. Finally, 
profitability is evaluated by the Profitability Ratio (henceforth PR) which is Net 
Operating Income divided by Total Assets. These are the  variables in equations (1) 
to (5). For each ratio, and according to Lev (1969), the objective is proxied as the 
corresponding sectoral average in the previous year: . 
----------------------------Insert Figure 1--------------------------------- 
 
In Section 2 we have introduced the problem of nonlinearities in the basic PAM 
model, pointing to six main factors with capacity to modify the adjustment process in 
the financial ratios. These factors are defined and coded in Table 1. 
 
----------------------------Insert Table 1--------------------------------- 
 
Note that the set of companies included in group , does not deviate too much 
from the target (which is, as indicated, the average of the industry in the previous 
period). The second group in this variable, , corresponds to companies that are far 
itY
n
* it 1i 1it
YY n

it,1d
it,2d
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from the target but below it, whereas the companies in the third group, , are also far 
from the target but above it. 
Table 2 shows a descriptive analysis of the main variables included in the study. The 
companies in the sample are of small size (56.2%), with low technology (45.6%). 
Mostly of companies are located in Catalonia (51.5%), operate in local markets (62.3%) 
and only a small percentage (6.9%) are below 10 years old. Those percentages are 
congruent with the official Spanish census (DIRCE) corresponding to the same sector 
and Autonomous Communities. With respect to the structure by subsector, detailed 
information is provided in the supplementary Table A. 
 
------------------------- Insert Table 2 -------------------- 
 
We have computed the financial ratios (CU, DE, PR) for the different categories 
of size, technological intensity, region, market and age. There are only small differences 
between the means corresponding to each group. With respect to the size factor, 
indebtedness (DE) decreases with size whereas liquidity (CU) goes in the other 
direction. A similar situation is produced in relation to technological intensity. The ratio 
DE decreases with the technological content, but CU tends to increase. These results are 
in accordance with previous literature that highlights the better situation, in terms of 
lower debt and higher profitability and liquidity, of larger and high-tech companies (Wu 
and Ho, 1997; Gallizo and Salvador, 2003). Current ratio (CU) grows up in companies 
with export activity, while DE ratio decreases for the same group. This result is also in 
accordance with previous studies which relate the international character of the firm 
with greater risks associated to its activity. In this case, firms tend to adopt more 
conservative financial policies, decreasing external indebtedness and maintaining more 
volume of short term assets (Pacheco, 2016). The CU ratio increases with the age of the 
company, but the DE ratio decreases. However, the PR ratio does not have a clear 
pattern. Berger and Udell (1998) study the evolution and types of financing as firms 
become older. These authors find that newcomer companies resort to more formal 
finance resources, raising bank indebtedness and other types of financial intermediaries. 
As firm gets older, accumulated retained earnings become an important source of 
funding in itself, as well as providing reassurance for potential external funders in 
relation to firm performance. 
it,3d
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
 This section focuses on the spatial structure on the explained variable 
 it it 1Y Y   for the three ratios (CU, DE, PR). In first place, we use the classical 
Moran I test (Moran, 1948) and its spatio-temporal version STMI (López et al., 2011) 
for different connectivity criteria to check for global dependence among the companies 
in space and time. Then, we obtain the Gi Getis-Ord statistic (Getis and Ord, 1992) to 
identify local spatial patterns. As indicated in Section 3, this analysis is conditional on 
the W contiguity matrix for which we try two different approaches based on the 
distance between the headquarters: (i) the great-circle and (ii) the nearest-neighbors 
criterion. Specifically, according to the first approach, two companies are considered 
connected if they are separated by a distance less than 5Km or 10Km (W5km; W10km); 
using the second criterion, the group of neighbors of each company is made of the 25 or 
50 nearest companies (W25nn; W50nn). 
The four matrices reflect a very localized network of dependencies, which is in 
accordance with the “kept an eye” principle on your competitors. Moreover, the local 
specification of W help us to reduce the bias arising from the boundary effect caused by 
the existence of companies located in the West border of the SAM that interact with 
companies not in our sample (because they are not located in the SAM). The four 
matrices are exogenous, assuming that the location of the companies is given, and are of 
binary type, where 1 indicates proximity and 0 non-proximity. Afterwards, the matrices 
have been row-standardized in order that each row adds to one. 
Table 3 shows the standardized Moran I and STMI statistics for each financial 
ratio, year and connectivity matrix. Let us remind that the null hypothesis of Moran I is 
no spatial dependence for the data under scrutiny and that null hypothesis of the second 
statistic is no spatio-temporal dependence. Under the null hypothesis, the limit 
distribution of both tests is standard normal. We find strong evidence of spatial 
dependence in the case of the PR ratio, for all periods considered, whereas the evidence 
is weaker in the case of CU and DE. In all cases, the STMI shows clear indications of 
spatial-temporal spatial autocorrelation. Let us note that the STMI takes the maximum 
value, in the three ratios, for the matrix W50nn and, therefore, we consider this matrix as 
the suitable candidate in the confirmatory analysis that follows. 
------------------------- Insert Table 3 ------------------- 
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Figure 2 shows the results of the local Gi statistics for the three ratios for the period 
2012-2011 using W50nn. A clear regional pattern emerges from them. For PR and CU 
we find big High-High clusters (red dots in Figure 2) of companies located in the 
metropolitan area of Barcelona, in the North of the SAM; the red dots extend also to 
other Catalonian provinces, like Lleida or Girona. The contrary occurs in the case of 
indebtedness, DE, where the blue dots, Low-Low clusters, dominate in the case of 
Catalonia. Southern provinces of the SAM are characterized by Low-Low clusters in 
CU and PR ratios and High-High clusters in DE. The tendency accentuates in this 
direction. 
                         ---------------------------Insert Figure 2------------------- 
These findings refer us to the impact of unobservable effects related of 
institutional and environmental factors. In fact, the Spanish case is characterized by a 
highly decentralized public administration, where the regions (Autonomous 
Communities, in this case) share, or even lead, a lot of public policies with the national 
Government (Tomas, 2015). Catalonia is one of the historical Spanish nationalities, 
which enjoys some benefits in relation to other territories. 
5.2. Confirmatory analysis 
We begin by estimating the basic PAM model extended with a set of 
multiplicative dummy variables to account for nonlinearities. We include the spatial lag 
of the gap  *it it 1Y Y   for each ratio in the right hand side of our baseline model 
which, in fact, is a SLX equation (we omit the inclusion of the spatial lags of the 
multiplicative dummy variables). Vega and Elhorst (2015) advocate for this 
specification as a more efficient way to begin with the discussion of a spatial model. 
Therefore, the equation is: 
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Where  ij; i, j, 1,...., n   denotes the (i,j) term of the W50nn contiguity matrix. 
Note that the reference group includes micro-companies whose gap lies between the 
10th and 90th percentiles, using low level of technology, located in the region of Murcia, 
without internationalization and between 5-10 years olds. Therefore, if a coefficient hk 
(h∈Ω={d,s,t,r,m,a}, k=1,…,nk) appears with a positive estimate(resp. negative) and 
significantly different from 0, this points that the corresponding group has more (resp. 
less), speed of convergence with respect to the reference group. The main results of the 
panel estimation appear in Table 4. 
The LR tests at the bottom of Table 4 corroborate the importance of controlling for 
individual and time effects. We should remember that the null hypothesis of the LR 
tests is that there are no unobserved effects in the equation whereas the alternative 
hypothesis states that there are unobserved effects both in the cross-sectional and in the 
time dimension (Baltagi, 2013). The three tests reject the null hypothesis (a similar 
conclusion is reached when using these tests only for the time or the cross-sectional 
dimension). Moreover, the Hausman tests indicate that the nature of the unobserved 
effects is fixed: In other words, the unobservables are correlated with the error term of 
the equation. The random effects model should be thus discarded. 
 
-------------------------------  Insert Table 4 ----------------------------------- 
 
The estimates corresponding to the two-way fixed effects model for the three ratios 
appear in the top panel of Table 4. Overall, the results are quite sensible. We find 
significant and positive adjustment coefficients () for the three financial ratios, which 
constitutes a strong support for the PAM hypothesis; moreover, they are roughly in line 
with previous results in the literature (Gallizo et al., 2008; Mate et al., 2012). The 
financial gap of neighbor companies, L, has a negative and significant effect on the 
financial adjustment of each company. In other words, a company surrounded by 
companies with great unbalances has weaker incentives to adjust its financial ratios. In 
addition, the suspicions about the presence of nonlinearities in the adjustment process 
are confirmed. The Chow tests show significant differences of most of the factors 
included in models. 
Regarding the distance to the gap, the speed of adjustment is greater for companies 
with CU and PR ratios below, and far, from the targets than for companies whose ratios 
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are almost at the target. However, the situation is not symmetric. The speed of 
adjustment is lower for companies with DE ratios far and above the targets. Companies 
with a high level of debt will try to reduce it because of the increasing costs associated 
with the disequilibrium (Faukelner et al., 2010; Aybar-Arias et al., 2012). Finally, 
companies with poor results in terms of profitability (PR) must improve their 
performance to keep market share whereas those companies more efficient than the 
average (in group 3) have few incentives to decelerate the movement towards the 
average. Despite the lower speed of adjustment in this case, market forces press the PR 
ratios.  Higher PR ratios, above form the target, will attract more competitors sharing 
the market quote and reducing profits (Davis and Peles, 1993). 
The size of the company is also an element to be considered. The results show 
significant and negative estimates, for the three ratios, in the case of small- or medium- 
to large-sized companies. Therefore, micro-sized companies have more incentives to 
readjust their financial structure. Davis and Peles (1993) and Wu and Ho (1997) 
obtained similar results for this variable stressing the importance, especially for small 
companies, of being as near as possible to the optimum. Small companies have stronger 
incentives to correct the disequilibrium because their high out of equilibrium costs 
(Davis and Peles, 1993). In addition, SMEs have more flexibility and less bureaucracy 
to reach the target values quicker than large firms (Wu and Ho, 1997). The pressure for 
large companies is weaker, their incentives are lower and therefore their reactions are 
produced more slowly. 
Regarding the technological intensity, in general terms, the estimates of the dummies 
tend to be positive, which means that the speed of adjustment increases as the 
technological content of the activity rises. Gallizo et al. (2008) find the same effect, 
concluding that the need for greater resource availability for the group of high-tech 
companies forces them to readjust their financial ratios more quickly. 
 The same can be said in relation to the trade patterns of the company. Firms 
working mainly for international markets face higher agency costs in comparison with 
firms more involved in domestic markets (Pacheco, 2016). Therefore, international 
firms have more incentives to adjust their financial ratios to the targets as faster as 
possible in order to avoid additional costs. Finally, we get that the age plays a relevant 
role shaping the non-linearities of this adjustment process. According to our 
expectations, we find that older firms have fewer incentives to adapt their financial 
ratios towards target values in comparison with newcomers (Cole, 2013). 
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The specification tests, LM and STMI, that appear at the bottom of Table 4 test for 
the omission of spatial interaction elements in the PAM models of (6). The conclusion 
that emerges from these tests is clear: the extended PAM equations are wrongly 
specified because of additional omitted spatial effects. The next step is to consider the 
most suitable spatial structure for our PAM. 
The Lagrange Multipliers, LM, are all very significant and do not offer useful clues 
to guide the specification (similar results are obtained with the robust LM)1. On this 
point, LeSage and Pace (2009) recommend starting the discussion using the spatial 
Durbin model of (5), which nests both the SLM and the SEM models. Two Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) tests can then be used to test the PAM-SDM (this is the alternative 
hypothesis) against the PAM-SEM or the PAM-SLM, respectively, in the null (Burridge 
1981). If both null hypotheses are rejected, then the PAM-SDM of (7) is the logical 
selection. 
 
(7)
 
 Table 5 depicts the estimated PAM-SDM models for the three financial ratios, 
including the corresponding LR tests at the bottom of the Table. This time, the 
conclusion is clear: the PAM-SDM cannot be rejected in favor of either the PAM-SLM 
or the PAM-SEM model. Overall, the results are satisfactory and very much in line with 
those presented in Table 4. Let us note that there are no symptoms of remaining spatial 
and/or temporal dependence in the errors of these estimates, according the STMI tests.  
 
------------------------- Insert Table 5 ------------------------------------- 
 
 The main difference lies in the measures of goodness-of-fit to the data for the 
three financial ratios. In addition, we get positive and significant spatial interaction 
                                                 
1 Moreover, we exclude the more general Cliff-Ord model, with spatial structure both in 
the mean equation and in the errors because their estimates offer clear symptoms of 
over-specification (where the spatial structure in the errors offsets, in the opposite sense, 
the spatial structure in the mean equation). 
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coefficients () related to the dependent variable  it it 1Y Y  . From a theoretical 
perspective, this term is related to the actions taken by companies in the neighborhood. 
That means that a company i will receive a positive shock on its adjustment coefficient 
if its neighbors are adjusting their financial ratios. Nevertheless, this effect is lower 
(0.05, 0.072 and 0.185 for CU, DE and PR respectively) than the effect associated to the 
characteristics of the neighbors (0.555, 0.445 and 0.616 for CU, DE and PR 
respectively). Therefore, regarding the channels of interaction between firms, our 
findings give more relevance to the characteristics of the neighborhood than to the 
decisions taken by companies in the neighborhood. This result seems to contradict the 
findings in Leary and Roberts which give more relevance to the decisions (2014). 
 
4.1 Direct and indirect effects on the PAM-SDM estimates 
The structure of the PAM-SDM model in (7) implies that there are spatial 
spillovers, which places some limitations on interpreting the estimates. Let us use an 
example. In a linear model without spatial effects, such as the following (if we add an 
intercept, nothing changes) , the slope  is the partial derivative 
of the endogenous variable, yi, with respect to the exogenous variable, xi, which 
coincides with the impact of a unitary change of xi, on yi. Note that this measure is the 
same for every observation in the sample. 
This is not necessarily true if there are spatial elements in the equation, as is the case 
of a simple SDM version of the previous model, . First, 
we should write the model in matrix notation: , where y and x are the 
(nx1) vectors of observations of variables y and x;  is a (nx2) matrix of 
observations of x or lags of x;  is a (2x1) vector of parameters; and e is the 
(nx1) vector of error terms. Then, we obtain the reduced form of the SDM equation as 
. 
The impact of a unitary change in the x variable of the i-th company (that is, the 
partial derivative measured evaluated in this point ) is: 
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 (8) 
 
where  is a (nx1) vector of zeros except the i-th term which is a one. Note that 
 is also a (nx1) vector, possibly, with all elements different from zero. The 
impact of a unitary change of the exogenous variable of the i-th company on the 
endogenous variable of the same company appears in the i-th term of this vector; the 
other (n-1) terms reflect the impact on the endogenous variable but of different 
companies. Note that these impacts on other companies are zero in the linear model.  
The differences are due to the spatial spillovers (similar results are obtained for other 
spatial models; see Elhorst, 2014) and led to LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 74) to 
distinguish between the so-called “Direct,” “Indirect” and “Total” effects of a unitary 
change on an exogenous variable, somewhere in the space (or in the network of 
companies). The direct effect measures the impact of a unitary change on a given 
exogenous variable, in the i-th location (company in our case) on the endogenous in the 
same location (company). The indirect effect is the impact of the same change, but on 
locations (companies) different from the i-th, and the total effect is the sum of the two. 
These effects, probably, will vary from location to location (company to company) 
which means too much information. In order to abridge the discussion of results, it is 
usual to present basic indicators such as the mean values of the corresponding effects. 
LeSage and Pace advise that the researcher should focus on these effects, rather than on 
the estimated values of the parameters, in order to attain a correct reading of the 
estimated spatial model. The results for the PAM-SDM model of (7) are included in 
Table 6. 
The direct effects for the variables related to the gap () are positive and significant 
in the three financial ratios, but not the indirect effects. The consequence is that the total 
effects are significantly smaller than those obtained using the non-spatial model (Table 
4). Therefore, a company, surrounded by a group of companies whose ratios are further 
from their targets, will have a negative effect on its own adjustment process. In other 
words, this company will receive few incentives from its environment to readjust the 
financial ratios. 
The terms associated with multiplicative dummy variables of the gap make evident 
the interaction in our dataset. The estimated direct effects are similar to the point 
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estimates in Table 5 but we also obtain a set of very important indirect effects. Our 
interpretation is that companies are pushed to move in the correct direction, first, by 
purely internal mechanisms (identified with the direct effects), and this impulse is 
strengthened if the neighboring companies are in a similar position. 
 
------------------------- Insert Table 6 ------------------------------------- 
 
Regarding the size of the company, the direct effects are in line with those in Table 5 
and the indirect effects are also relevant. According to these results, being located in a 
milieu characterized by small- and medium-sized companies (in contrast with that 
dominated by micro-firms) stimulates the company to adjust faster its financial ratios. 
Similar results are obtained in relation to technology. The direct effects are in line 
with the estimates in Table 5, showing that a high-tech company tends to react faster to 
external shocks than other companies, whereas the indirect effects, smaller, tend to be 
positive which means that a high tech neighborhood favors the speed up of the 
adjustment process of the companies present there. The region where the company is 
located also influences this adjustment process but the pattern estimated is not clear; 
obviously Murcia is in the worst position. The internationalization of the company 
increases the speed of adjustment due to the higher risk associated to these markets. 
This result is strengthened if the other companies in the neighborhood are also involved 
in import/export activities. Finally, the age of the company appears, as expected, with 
negative estimates for the direct and indirect effects, highlighting the break between 
newcomers and mature old stablished firms. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that the financial decisions and the characteristics the 
companies of the milieu where is located a company strongly influences the financial 
behavior, especially, of SMEs. We separate from the study of Leary and Robert (2014) 
in taking into account the geographical proximity of peers as an explicit factor 
conditioning the reaction of companies to unbalances in their financial structure. Our 
main hypothesis is that geographical proximity favors informational flows among 
economic agents (Carbó et al., 2003; Degryse and Ongena, 2005), encouraging more 
efficient responses in the financial sphere. We find that the characteristics of the 
neighborhood is a more relevant factor that the decisions taken by the neighbors. These 
results extend those obtained by Leary and Roberts (2014) under the assumption of no 
spatial interaction. 
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We also find strong non-linearities in the adjustment process in function of several 
firms’ characteristics. These results coincide with previous studies (Lee and Wu, 1988; 
Gallizo et al., 2008; Mate et al., 2012).  
In particular, we corroborate the existence of a so-called herd behavior in the case of 
SMEs, which modulates the first impulse, inner, of the company. Thus, there are 
particular environments that favor reactive companies. Responsive companies are 
surrounded by environments with relative young and medium-sized companies with 
high tech activities acting in international markets. This general result does not depend 
on the financial dimension considered. Our findings, the same as Leary and Roberts 
(2014), also point to questions related to learning and reputation as one of the causes of 
this proximity effect. We add that the impact of these effects will be accentuated 
because of geographical proximity that favors informational flows and reduces the 
consequences of informational asymmetries (Degresy and Ongena, 2005). 
Finally, we have to admit that this paper represents only a new step in order to better 
understand the interactions produced in the financial sphere of industrial companies. It 
is clear that further contributions are necessary to characterize the mechanisms and the 
dynamics that promote the interactions among geographically clustered companies. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Number of companies by CNAE code (2-digit) in Spain, in the SMA area and in our 
sample. 
 
CNAE (2 digit) Total† SMA‡ Sample %(Total) %(SMA)
10 Manuf. of food products 24171 7843 1250 5.2% 15.9% 
11 Manuf. of beverages 5025 954 192 3.8% 20.1% 
12 Manuf. of tobacco products 47 3 1 2.1% 33.3% 
13 Manuf. of textiles 6437 2779 784 12.2% 28.2% 
14 Manuf. of wearing apparel 9710 2701 307 3.2% 11.4% 
15 Manuf. of leather and related products 4707 2033 447 9.5% 22.0% 
16 Manuf. of wood and of products of wood 12707 3513 623 4.9% 17.7% 
17 Manuf. of paper and paper products 1870 824 308 16.5% 37.4% 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 15600 4029 856 5.5% 21.2% 
19 Manuf. of coke and refined petroleum products 19 6 5 26.3% 83.3% 
20 Manuf. of chemicals and chemical products 3715 1621 617 16.6% 38.1% 
21 Manuf. of basic pharmaceutical products  375 129 45 12.0% 34.9% 
22 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products 5123 2224 770 15.0% 34.6% 
23 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 10397 3952 738 7.1% 18.7% 
24 Manuf. of basic metals 1411 442 222 15.7% 50.2% 
25 Manuf. of fabricated metal products … 39245 12246 2077 5.3% 17.0% 
26 Manuf. of computer, electronic … 2796 841 182 6.5% 21.6% 
27 Manuf. of electrical equipment 2441 867 283 11.6% 32.6% 
28 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 6181 2554 917 14.8% 35.9% 
29 Manuf. of motor vehicles, … 2005 641 186 9.3% 29.0% 
30 Manuf. of other transport equipment 869 250 39 4.5% 15.6% 
31 Manuf. of furniture 15369 4626 626 4.1% 13.5% 
32 Other manufacturing 9808 2480 333 3.4% 13.4% 
33 Repair and installation of machinery … 10575 2577 636 6.0% 24.7% 
TOTAL: 190603 60135 12444 6.5% 20.7% 
† Number of companies in Spain with CNAE code 1000-3300. 
‡ Number of companies in the Autonomous Communities of Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and Andalusia with CNAE code 
1000-3320.  
Source: DIRCE www.ine.es
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Table 1: Factors influencing the adjustment process in the PAM equation 
 Distance to the objective (in the corresponding ratio) 
  
  
  
 Company size2 
  if it is a micro company (less than 10 employees); 0 otherwise. 
  if it is a small company (between 11 and 50 employees); 0 otherwise. 
  if it is a medium company (51 and 250 employees); 0 otherwise. 
 Technological Intensity (TI)3 
 if the company pertains to a low TI index sector; 0 otherwise. 
 1 if the company pertains to a medium-low TI index sector; 0 otherwise. 
  if the company pertains to a medium-high TI index sector; 0 otherwise. 
  if the company pertains to a high TI index sector; 0 otherwise. 
 Spanish Autonomous Community4 
 if the company pertains to the Region of Murcia; 0 otherwise. 
 if the company pertains to the Region of Andalusia; 0 otherwise. 
 if the company pertains to the Region of Valencia; 0 otherwise. 
 if the company pertains to the Region of Catalonia; 0 otherwise. 
mit Market 
 mit,1 = 1 if the company operates only in local market; 0 otherwise. 
 mit,2 = 1 if the company only imports; 0 otherwise. 
 mit,3 = 1 if the company only exports; 0 otherwise. 
 mit,4 = 1 if the company imports and exports; 0 otherwise. 
ait Age 
 ait,1 = 1 if the company is less than 10 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 ait,2 = 1 if the company is between 10 and 20 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 ait,3 = 1 if the company is more than 20 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 and  indicate the percentiles of 10% and 90% respectively in the distribution of gaps to the 
optimum in the corresponding ratio, in period t.
 
 
                                                 
2 European Commission (2003) considers a medium size company if the number of employees is between 
51 and 250. 
3 According to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities of the European Community. 
4 Autonomous Community corresponds to Eurostar NUTS II regions. 
itd
*
it,1 t it it 1 td 1 (Y Y if  L U ; 0 otherwise)     
*
it,2 it it 1 td 1 (Y Y if   L ; 0 otherwis) e  
*
it,3 it it 1 td 1 (Y Y if   U ; 0 otherwis) e  
its
it,1s  1
it,2s  1
it,3s  1
itt
it,1t  1
it,2t  1
it,3t  1
it,4t  1
itr
it,1r  1
it,2r  1
it,3r  1
it,4r  1
tL tU
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Table 2: Descriptive analysis of companies in the sample by categories. 
 
 Companies CU DE PR 
N % Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
 by the Gap‡ 
Y*it-Yit-1<P10 1244 10% 0.08 2.64 0.76 0.29 0.01 0.68 0.32 0.08 0.05 1.95 0.55 0.23 
P10<Y*it-Yit-1<P90 9955 80% 0.53 3.92 1.58 0.51 0.21 0.95 0.63 0.15 0.37 3.52 1.42 0.47 
Y*it-Yit-1>P90 1244 10% 1.33 4.36 2.83 0.53 0.56 0.99 0.89 0.06 1.02 4.67 2.70 0.53 
 by Size† 
Micro 6991 56.2% 0.10 4.36 1.59 0.68 0.01 0.99 0.65 0.19 0.05 4.38 1.43 0.69 
Small 4569 36.7% 0.08 4.25 1.66 0.68 0.11 0.99 0.60 0.18 0.06 4.39 1.50 0.64 
Medium 884 7.1% 0.13 4.01 1.65 0.68 0.14 0.99 0.56 0.17 0.27 4.67 1.47 0.61 
 by Technological Intensity† 
Low TI 5676 45.6% 0.08 4.25 1.56 0.68 0.11 0.99 0.63 0.19 0.05 4.67 1.47 0.72 
Medium-Low TI 4480 36.0% 0.20 4.18 1.64 0.68 0.01 0.99 0.62 0.18 0.05 4.19 1.42 0.62 
Medium High TI 2058 16.5% 0.10 4.36 1.73 0.67 0.16 0.99 0.60 0.18 0.13 4.39 1.49 0.61 
High TI 230 1.9% 0.27 4.09 1.79 0.74 0.18 0.98 0.58 0.19 0.09 3.42 1.42 0.62 
 by Region† 
Andalusia 987 7.9% 0.14 3.76 1.33 0.63 0.14 0.99 0.67 0.18 0.05 4.21 1.23 0.71 
Murcia 840 6.7% 0.18 3.97 1.45 0.60 0.12 0.99 0.65 0.18 0.08 3.50 1.25 0.58 
Catalonia 6404 51.5% 0.10 4.36 1.71 0.69 0.11 0.99 0.60 0.18 0.08 4.67 1.55 0.67 
Valencia 4213 33.9% 0.08 4.19 1.59 0.66 0.01 0.99 0.64 0.19 0.05 4.39 1.41 0.64 
 by Market† 
Local market 7759 62.3% 0.08 4.36 1.57 0.68 0.10 0.99 0.64 0.19 0.05 4.39 1.45 0.70 
Only Import 932 7.5% 0.25 4.25 1.64 0.66 0.11 0.98 0.62 0.18 0.10 3.84 1.50 0.63 
Only Export 1177 9.5% 0.31 4.19 1.69 0.67 0.14 0.99 0.60 0.18 0.10 4.67 1.43 0.67 
Import/Export 2576 20.7 0.13 4.25 1.72 0.67 0.01 0.99 0.59 0.18 0.06 4.35 1.47 0.58 
 by Age† 
< 10 853 6.9% 0.21 3.44 1.48 0.60 0.20 0.99 0.71 0.17 0.11 3.82 1.68 0.73 
10 ≤ Age ≤20  5954 47.8% 0.12 4.10 1.51 0.64 0.12 0.99 0.66 0.18 0.05 4.67 1.47 0.69 
> 20 5637 45.3% 0.08 4.36 1.75 0.71 0.01 0.99 0.56 0.18 0.08 4.33 1.41 0.62 
TOTAL 12444 100% 0.08 4.36 1.62 0.68 0.01 0.99 0.62 0.19 0.05 4.67 1.46 0.67 
‡ Descriptive statistics for Y*it-Yit-1 in the year 2009 
† Average value for the period 2006-2012. SD means standard deviation.  
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Table 3: Moran I and STMI statistics of global spatial autocorrelation.  
Variable W Moran I for periods t-(t-1) STMI 
11-12 10-11 09-10 08-09 07-08 06-07 
CUit-CUit-1 
W5km 1.84* 1.29 0.59 0.16 -0.84 0.00 4.02*** 
W10km 1.69* -0.05 -0.38 -0.22 1.82* -0.18 5.31*** 
W25nn 1.44* 1.11 0.13 -0.84 -1.16 0.15 3.39*** 
W50nn 2.11** 1.85** 0.55 -0.19 0.33 -0.48 6.34*** 
DEit-DEit-1 
W5km 0.15 0.57 -1.56 1.10 0.51 0.04 6.87*** 
W10km 0.78 0.48 0.00 0.55 1.58 0.84 11.49*** 
W25nn -0.31 1.64* 0.97 1.82** -1.27 -0.05 8.79*** 
W50nn 0.60 2.21** 2.39** 2.26** 0.09 0.78 14.38*** 
PRit-PRit-1 
W5km 0.51 3.46*** 4.30*** 6.89*** 3.04*** 2.11** 63.34*** 
W10km 1.39 4.27*** 5.29*** 7.59*** 3.59*** 3.59*** 92.84*** 
W25nn 1.45* 4.66*** 5.75*** 9.41*** 2.68*** 3.13*** 75.60*** 
W50nn 1.72* 4.32*** 6.40*** 11.41*** 4.46*** 4.22*** 105.81*** 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4: Estimate of the baseline PAM model, SLX version (contiguity matrix: W50nn) 
 CU kF DE kF  PR kF
 0.515***  0.440***  0.600***  
L spatial lag -0.038  -0.082***  -0.116***  
 (below 10% gap) 0.156*** 
320.40***
0.007 
25.64*** 
0.092*** 
199.21*** (above 90% gap) -0.012 0.039*** -0.018*** 
 (small size) -0.034*** 
0.00 
-0.017*** 
0.05 
-0.026*** 
38.93***  (med/large size) -0.034** -0.028** -0.108** 
 (low/med tech) 0.004 
4.51 
0.015** 
2.78 
0.016*** 
30.92***  (med/high tech) 0.022** 0.028*** 0.071 
 (high tech) -0.020 0.041* -0.001*** 
 (Andalusia) 0.067*** 
0.35 
0.029* 
11.99*** 
0.052*** 
0.31  (Valencia) 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.047*** 
 (Catalonia) 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 
 m2 (Import) 0.023 
1.05 
0.048*** 
4.54 
0.068*** 
1.21  m3 (Export) 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.075*** 
 m4 (Import/Export) 0.027** 0.063*** 0.084*** 
 a2 (10<old<20 years) -0.034** 32.31*** -0.029
** 25.52*** -0.068
*** 3.21 
 a3 (old>20 years) -0.078*** -0.064*** -0.081*** 
2 0.170  0.005  0.106  
R2 0.304  0.240  0.352  
LogLik -39896.8  93396.2  -22278.0  
Diagnostic Tests       
LR tests for time+indiv. effects 1608.7***  3114.2***  2255.2***  
Hausman test 1045.7***  1264.5***  1014.5***  
STMI  3.02***  4.38**  13.91***  
LM spatial lag  9.57***  20.09***  192.90***  
LM spatial error 8.98***  19.06***  192.93**  
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1 
kF : F tests for the significance of the respective group of multiplicative dummy variables. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Spatial Durbin panel data model† (contiguity matrix: W50nn) 
 
 CU  DE  PR  
 0.555***  0.445***  0.616***  
L -spatial lag -0.090***  -0.114**  -0.235***  
 (below 10% gap) 0.123*** 
161.5***
0.010** 
23.50*** 
0.068*** 
88.24*** (above 90% gap) 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.008 
 (small size) -0.033*** 
0.00 
-0.018*** 
1.06 
-0.029***
88.03*** (med/large size) -0.028* -0.029** -0.110***
 (low/med tech) -0.001 
3.80 
0.014** 
2.80 
0.018** 
28.77*** (med/high tech) 0.013 0.027*** 0.071*** 
 (high tech) -0.030 0.040* 0.004 
 (Andalusia) 0.073*** 
3.58 
0.030* 
11.42*** 
0.052*** 
2.96  (Valencia) 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.036** 
 (Catalonia) 0.046*** 0.064*** 0.031** 
 m2 (Import) 0.023 
0.77 
0.048*** 
4.22 
0.066*** 
1.53  m3 (Export) 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.079*** 
 m4 (Import/Export) 0.023** 0.062*** 0.085*** 
 a2 (10<old<20 years) -0.034** 55.88*** -0.030
** 34.41*** -0.061
***
1.04 
 a3 (old>20 years) -0.091*** -0.068*** -0.069***
  0.055**  0.072**  0.185***  
2 0.171  0.005  0.106  
R2 0.366  0.351  0.450  
Log-Lik -39883.6 93402.3  -22272.4  
Diagnostic Tests       
 STMI -0.05  0.23  1.08  
LR test  26.4***  13.2***  11.93***  
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1 
† The bias-correction of Lee and Yu (2010) was used in the estimation. 
: Chi-squared test for the significance of the respective group of multiplicative dummy variables. 
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Table 6: Estimated Direct, Indirect and Total effects for the Spatial Durbin Model 
 Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects 
 CU DE PR CU DE PR CU DE PR 
 0.576*** 0.459*** 0.627*** -0.061*** -0.086*** -0.147*** 0.515*** 0.373*** 0.480*** 
 (below 10% gap) 0.120*** 0.009* 0.068*** 0.008*** 0.001* 0.018*** 0.129*** 0.010* 0.086*** 
 (above 90% gap) 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.008 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.010 
 (small size) -0.035*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.037*** -0.019*** -0.037***
 (med/large size) 0.006 -0.028** -0.109*** 0.000 -0.003** -0.028*** 0.006 -0.030** -0.137***
 (low/med tech) -0.001 0.016** 0.020*** 0.000 0.001** 0.005*** -0.001 0.017** 0.025*** 
 (med/high tech) 0.010 0.029*** 0.073*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.019*** 0.010 0.032*** 0.092*** 
 (high tech) -0.028 0.041* 0.006 -0.002 0.004* 0.002 -0.030 0.045* 0.008 
 (Andalusia) 0.039*** 0.013 0.040** 0.003*** 0.001 0.011** 0.041*** 0.014 0.051** 
 (Valencia) 0.030* 0.062*** 0.025* 0.002* 0.006*** 0.006* 0.032* 0.067*** 0.031* 
 (Catalonia) 0.027* 0.049*** 0.019 0.002* 0.004*** 0.005 0.029* 0.053*** 0.024 
 m2 (Import) 0.008 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.018*** 0.008 0.052*** 0.085*** 
 m3 (Export) 0.040*** 0.033** 0.080*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.021*** 0.042*** 0.036** 0.101*** 
 m4 (Import/Export) 0.003* 0.060*** 0.086*** 0.000* 0.005*** 0.022*** 0.003* 0.066*** 0.108*** 
 a2 (10<old<20 years) -0.048** -0.028** -0.060*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.016*** -0.051** -0.031** -0.076***
 a3 (old>20 years) -0.099*** -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.105*** -0.072*** -0.085***
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1 
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Figure 1: Location of companies in the sample 
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Figure 2: Local Gi Getis-Ord cluster maps (2012) 
CU DE PR 
 
Spanish Nuts III units (provinces). In red, companies with High-High Gi values for the ratio. In blue, companies with Low-
Low Gi values for the ratio. In grey, companies with non-significant Gi values for the ratio. 
 
 
 
